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“Without the right to work, all other rights were meaningless.”1 
“Being without money is hard, it makes you feel like less of a
man. You have no voice; no one will listen to you.”2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Work, or at least the aspiration to work, is ubiquitous.”3  Work is  
transformative and provides a person not only with a means of paying for 
the costs of life, but also with a sense of identification and value.  Work
also allows for a sense of belonging to a community and is essential to 
one’s sense of place in the world.4  For those who have fled persecution 
1. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad Hoc Comm. on Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, 2d Sess., 37th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.37 (Sept. 16, 1950) 
(statement of Mr. Henkin of the United States). 
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & SETON HALL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, AT LEAST
LET THEM WORK: THE DENIAL OF WORK AUTHORIZATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (Nov. 2013) (citing Seton Hall interview with Bosco
N.) [hereinafter AT LEAST LET THEM WORK], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2013/11/12/least-let-them-work [http://perma.cc/39S4-2M99]. 
3.  David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 129 (1988) (discussing the importance of the ability to work).
4. This is particularly important in immigrant communities.  For example, a study
of immigrant integration found that work is not merely a means of producing income, but 
also provides a “purpose to life, it defines status and identity, and enables individuals to 
establish relationships with others in the society . . . [t]herefore, for those who are out of 
work, the result is not only a decline in psychological well-being, but also a delay in 
adaptation.”  Zeynep Aycan & John W. Berry, Impact of Employment-Related Experiences
on Immigrants’ Psychological Well-Being and Adaptation to Canada, 28 CANADIAN J. 
BEHAV. SCI. 240, 248 (1996). 
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and are seeking asylum protection in the United States, work takes on an
even greater importance.  For the vast majority of asylum seekers, work 
holds the key to economic survival, as federal law also precludes them 
from accessing nearly any social benefits.5  Asylum seekers are only 
entitled to a lawyer at their own expense—which may hinder their ability
to retain counsel and lessen the chances that they would be granted 
asylum—so work is closely linked with the ability to afford a lawyer and
dramatically increases the chances of gaining protection.6  For asylum
seekers who suffer from mental health issues as a result of torture or
persecution, work is also a crucial element in recovery.7 
Notwithstanding the essential nature of work for asylum seekers,
United States immigration law bars them from accessing employment for 
at least six months and often for years.8  While their asylum claims
proceed, asylum seekers must remain idle, surviving only from the charity
5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2012).  In order for asylum seekers to participate in
state or federal health insurance exchange programs and seek premium tax credits under 
the Affordable Care Act, they must have employment authorization.  See “Lawfully 
Present” Individuals Under the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L.  CTR. (Sept. 2012),
available at http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=809 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-1(g)
(2014); 77 Fed. Reg. 30, 377 (May 23, 2012)). 
6. Studies show that those with lawyers are almost three times as likely to be 
granted asylum in the United States.  See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L.  REV. 295, 340 (2007) (“[W]hether an
asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most important factor affecting the
outcome of her case.” (citing Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, 
in INSIGHT, at 1, 5–6 (Migration Pol’y Inst., No. 4, 2005), available at http://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/insight/InsightKerwin.pdf; Charles H. Kuck, Legal Assistance for 
Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of Alternative Practices, in STUDY ON 
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 232, 239 (2004); Andrew I. Schoenhotz & 
Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 739, 739–40 (2002)). 
7. See e.g., AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 30 (“Work may be the 
single ‘most important thing’ in rehabilitating traumatized asylum seekers, said Dr. Joanne 
Ahola, a medical doctor of both the Weill Cornell Center for Human Rights and Research
Institute Without Walls. . . . A job gives asylum seekers a sense of purpose and can 
function as a ‘distraction from thinking about traumatic experiences.’”). 
8.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012). 
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of others.9  The only other option is to work without legal authorization and
risk exploitation and negative immigration consequences.10 
Under international law, one becomes a refugee when the events giving 
rise to such status take place rather than when the receiving country
affords such status.11  However, under United States immigration law, 
only refugees, who have been granted asylum or who have had their 
claims pending for at least 180 days through no fault of their own, are 
eligible for employment authorization.12  Ostensibly, the United States 
denies work authorization and public benefits to asylum seekers to deter
“economic migrants” from filing fraudulent asylum applications to work
9. See  AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 27–31 (documenting the 
emotional toll caused by forcing asylum seekers to remain idle and dependent on others). 
10. For example, United States immigration law imposes a ten-year bar on
readmission for any alien who has been in the country unlawfully for at least one year and
then departs. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (2012).  To avoid penalizing asylum seekers,
Congress carved out an exception for time during which an asylum seeker has a pending
bona fide asylum application.  See § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(II).  However, this exception does not
apply if the asylum seeker worked without authorization. See id. (“No period of time in 
which an alien has a bona fide application for asylum pending under [8 U.S.C. § 
1158] shall be taken into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the
United States under clause (i) unless the alien during such period was employed without 
authorization in the United States.”) (emphasis added). See also Bar on Work 
Authorization Creates Hardship, REFUGEE R., June 30, 1996, at 6–7 (noting that the denial 
of work authorization and social benefits to asylum seekers in the United States has resulted in
more homelessness, psychological deterioration, stress, illegal work, exploitation, 
and begging). 
11. James C. Hathaway & Annie K. Cusick, Refugee Rights Are Not Negotiable, 14 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 481, 484–85 (2000).  As refugee scholars have noted, states try to avoid 
their obligations to refugees by denying them that title, or even that of asylum seeker and
instead, labeling them as “‘displaced persons,’ ‘illegal immigrants,’ ‘economic migrants,’
‘quasi-refugees,’ ‘aliens,’ ‘departees,’ ‘boat people,’ or ‘stowaways.’”  GUY S. GOODWIN-
GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (3d ed. 2007).
12.  § 1158(d)(2). 
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lawfully.13 The denial of work authorization is also part of a broader effort
to deter asylum seekers from coming to the United States.14 
This Article critiques the United States’ bar on employment for asylum 
seekers on a number of fronts.  Beginning with a historical perspective, I
explore the more humane regime that existed in the United States until
1995. Under this prior system, asylum seekers with bona fide claims were 
permitted to work while their claims proceeded.  This Article examine the 
underlying fears and policy goals that led Congress to dramatically curtail
protection and the right to work for asylum seekers. By situating the 
prohibition on work for asylum seekers within the larger context of overall
punitive immigration reforms and the increasing criminalization of
immigration law, this Article argues that the ban on employment for
asylum seekers is unnecessary as a means to deter fraud.  It also argues 
that it is inconsistent with other humanitarian immigration relief that 
exists in United States immigration law. 
Turning to the Refugee Convention itself, it is argued that denying 
refugees seeking asylum the right to work violates the spirit of the Refugee
Convention and the very right to seek asylum.15  This Article further argues
13. See JOHN COLLETT, SOCIAL WORK, IMMIGRATION, AND ASYLUM 78 (Debra Hayes &
Beth Humphries, eds., 2004).  Such arguments are premised on the distinction between
“deserving” true refugees and undeserving “economic migrants.” Id. This distinction fails 
to capture the nuances in migration and the mix of persecution and economic harm that 
may be the impetus for fleeing. “The poverty people are escaping is often tied in with the
political and social malaise a country is experiencing: ‘by suggesting that there are “genuine”
people that are forced out of their homes by persecution and war, on the one hand, and 
those who simply seek a better life, on the other, the simplistic and unhelpful dichotomy
between an asylum-seeker and an economic migrant . . . is perpetuated.  In reality, “the 
same situations of societal transformations and crisis linked to war, poverty, and nation-
state formation” contribute to a mixed flow of asylum seekers and economic migrants.” 
In this context, to question whether people leave out of desperation or aspiration is
irrelevant. They seek to escape from social, economic and/or political insecurity to a more
secure future.”  P. Kahn, Asylum-Seekers in the UK: Implications for Social Service
Involvement, 8 SOC. WORK & SOC. SCI. REV. 116, 121 (2000). 
14.  The United States utilizes a broad array of tactics to deter asylum seekers from
accessing its territory, including mandatory detention and denial of employment authorization. 
Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.  
REV. 625, 627, 629 (2009). See also  GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 11, at 50 
(“[T]he developed world, in particular, expends considerable energy in trying to find ways
to prevent claims for protection being made at their borders, or to allow for them to be 
summarily passed on or back to others.”). 
15. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (guaranteeing a right to seek asylum). 
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that denying a means of support and attempting to make life so difficult 
that asylum seekers choose to return home to persecution rather than seek 
protection amounts to constructive nonrefoulement in violation of the 
Refugee Convention.
Finally, from a policy perspective, this Article argues that allowing 
asylum seekers to work while their claims proceed would restore dignity 
to refugees and realign U.S. immigration policy with important international 
law norms.  It would also be consistent with domestic immigration policy for
other classes of similarly situated vulnerable immigrants.  Additionally, 
in light of the heightened enforcement efforts and more restrictive 
immigration regime which now exists in the United States, it is unlikely
that the number of fraudulent asylum applications filed would significantly 
increase.
II. DEHUMANIZING THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 
The number of people seeking asylum protection around the world 
continues to climb.  In 2014, 866,000 people sought asylum in industrialized
countries, an increase of 45% from the prior year.16  The United States 
received the second highest number of these asylum claims.17  In 2014,
approximately 121,200 new asylum claims were filed in the United States, a
44% increase from the prior year.18  While the number of people fleeing 
persecution and torture in their homelands continues to climb dramatically,
countries around the world are making it harder for these refugees to gain 
access to asylum protection.19 
One way the United States and other countries have made it harder for 
refugees to seek protection is by removing any means of self-sufficiency 
during the asylum adjudication process.  Those refugees who are lucky 
enough to be admitted to the United States lawfully—or who enter the 
country without being detected—have one year in which to seek asylum 
protection.20  These refugees are not allowed to work or to receive any 
social benefits unless either they are granted asylum or more than six 
months have passed without a decision through no fault of the asylum 
16. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR ASYLUM TRENDS 2014, LEVELS
AND TRENDS IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 2 (2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ 
551128679.html [http://perma.cc/E7PW-AJG5].
 17. Id.  While the United States was the industrialized nation with the highest number 
of asylum claims for seven consecutive years, Germany has outplaced the United 
States for the past two years. Id.
 18. Id.
 19. Nessel, supra note 14, at 627–28. 
20.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(b) (2012). 
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seeker.21  Asylum seekers are thus left with a Hobson’s choice: rush to 
present their cases in hopes of gaining asylum and the right to work—but
risk not having sufficient time to adequately prepare the case—or take
time to prepare their cases and forego the possibility of working while the
case proceeds. Adding another layer to the dilemma is the fact that there 
is no right to free counsel in asylum proceedings.22  The only way to
proceed with counsel is to hire a lawyer, a prospect undermined by the
inability to work.23 
A. The System before “Reform” 
Asylum seekers in the United States have not always had to choose 
between destitution and inadequately prepared asylum applications.  When
the Refugee Act was implemented in 1980, Congress’s intention was to
bring United States law into harmony with its obligations under the U.N. 
Refugee Convention.24  From 1980 until 1987, the district director at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had discretion as to
whether to grant employment authorization to an alien who was seeking 
asylum.25  In 1987, after a class action challenge where a district court
21.  § 1158(d)(2). 
22. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2014); Yunie Hong & Timothy Griffiths, A Matter of Life 
and Death: Asylum Seekers’ Lack of Access to Competent Legal Representation, LEGAL
SERVICES OF N. CAL., http://equity.lsnc.net/a-matter-of-life-and-death-asylum-seekers’-
lack-of-access-to-competent-legal-representation [http://perma.cc/K6T4-JPRB] (last visited
June 9, 2015). 
23. Id. (“Even if jobs were plentiful, asylum seekers cannot simply work to earn the 
money they need to pay for an attorney, because they cannot get employment authorization
until after their cases have been filed and pending for at least 6 months–and that’s the 
best case scenario.”).
24. The United States ratified the Refugee Convention in 1968 when it signed the 
U.N. Optional Protocol on Refugees (incorporating the Refugee Convention).  RUTH 
ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32621, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY ON ASYLUM
SEEKERS, 3 (2005), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32621.pdf [http://
perma.cc/39GD-S47Z].  From 1968 to 1980, the United States did not have a domestic law
on refugee protection and instead relied upon ad hoc legislation and discretion. Id.
 25. See Employment Authorization, 45 Fed. Reg. 19,563 (Mar. 26, 1980) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 109).  Former 8 C.F.R. § 109.1(b)(2) provided that “[a]ny alien 
who has filed a non-frivolous application for asylum pursuant to Part 208 of this chapter 
may be granted permission to be employed for the period of time necessary to decide the 
case.” Former 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 provided that “[u]pon the filing of a nonfrivolous I-589,
the district director may, in his discretion, grant a request by the applicant for
employment authorization.”  Once granted, employment authorization could be revoked 
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judge found a likelihood of irreparable harm if the district director was 
allowed to continue to deny employment authorizations to asylum seekers,26 
the INS promulgated new regulations guaranteeing a right to employment
authorization in all nonfrivolous cases.27 For the next eight years, a refugee 
in need of protection could apply for asylum and the right to work
simultaneously.28  As long as the government did not find the application
for asylum to be frivolous, it granted employment authorization so that the 
asylum seeker could pay for the basic necessities of life and survive while
the claim was adjudicated.29 
This system of allowing asylum seekers to work and support themselves
while their cases proceeded was consistent with the magnitude of the
interest at stake.  As the Court in National Center for Immigrants Rights 
found, “The hardship [to aliens] from being unable to work to support 
themselves and their dependents . . . is beyond question.”30 
However, cases proceeded slowly because of a growing backlog. When 
the Asylum Corps was first established to adjudicate affirmative asylum 
claims, it expected that it would decide about 70,000 claims per year.31 
But by 1992, 103,000 people filed affirmative asylum claims in the United 
States.32  The following year, 150,000 people sought asylum in the United
States.33 As the backlog of asylum cases continued to mount, adjudication 
slowed down. Additionally, because the immigration regime at the time
did not include the myriad of enforcement and deterrent mechanisms that
under some circumstances.  Pursuant to former 8 C.F.R. § 109.2(a), “[e]mployment
authorization granted under § 109.1(b) of this part may be revoked by the district director
when it appears that one or more of the conditions upon which it was granted no longer 
exist, or for good cause shown.” 
26. Diaz v. INS, 648 F. Supp. 638, 657 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (granting a preliminary
injunction prohibiting denial and revocation of work authorization until adjudication 
process for asylum claim had been completed).  As the judge found, “I am hard pressed to
see how placing a refugee in a position where he or she must break the law to survive
during the years it may take for a decision on a political asylum application cannot be 
considered an irreparable hardship.” Id. at 648. 
27. Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216, 16,226 (May 1, 1987)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a). 
28. Id.
 29. See id. 
30.  Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (1984). 
31. History of the United States Asylum Officer Corps, AM. IMMIGR. L. CENTER, 
http://www.ailc.com/services/asylum/history.htm#F [http://perma.cc/26ME-YRW9] (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
32. Id.
 33. Id. 
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exist today, asylum seekers who gained employment authorization could 
evade removal if the asylum claim was ultimately denied.34 
Although it stands to reason that there must have been some degree of 
fraud taking place, greatly exaggerated accounts of rampant abuse picked up
traction in the media, including allegations that anyone could get a work
permit by uttering the words “political asylum.”35  This caused a flurry of
activity in Congress.36  During congressional hearings on asylum reform,
the number of asylum applications was characterized as a “torrent” and as a
“giant cascade.”37 
David Martin, an immigration scholar and former general counsel to 
INS, recounted a mix of political factors that led to the decoupling of
asylum and employment authorization.38  For example, just one week into the
new Clinton administration, a lone gunman who opened fire outside the 
CIA headquarters in northern Virginia, killing two, was identified as a 
Pakistani national who allegedly entered the United States illegally and
gained an extended stay in this country, with work authorization, as an 
asylum applicant.39  In addition, “some [of the men] charged in the World 
Trade Center bombing a month later also turned out to be asylum
applicants who had stayed in the United States as part of the backlog.”40 
34. Asylum and Inspections Reform: Hearing on H.R. 1153, H.R. 1355, and H.R. 
1679 Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, and Refugees of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1–3 (1993) (statement of Romano L. Mazzoli, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Int’l Law, Immigration, and Refugees). 
35. See e.g., Ira H. Mehlman, The New Jet Set: Think the Rio Grande Is a Porous 
Border? Try New York’s JFK, Where Anyone Can Enter Through the Magic of Political 
Asylum, NAT’L REV., Mar. 15, 1993, at 40, 60 (referring to a Liberian asylum seeker at 
JFK airport and asserting that “[o]nce he utters ‘political asylum’ his chances of remaining 
in the United States are 93%.”). According to the article, the asylum officer at JFK airport 
complained, “We’re being deluged.  It’s scandalous . . . In a matter of hours he’s going to 
be walking out onto the street joining the ranks of the unemployed.  We don’t know 
anything about him.  We don’t know if he has AIDS.  We don’t know if he’s a murderer.” 
Id.
 36. Tim Weiner, Pleas for Asylum Inundate System for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 25, 1993, at A1 (discussing how immigrants, including one of the suspects in the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing, “can arrive at an airport having destroyed [their] travel 
documents, [and] plead for asylum” before disappearing). 
37. Asylum and Inspections Reform, supra note 34, at 1. 
38. David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy: The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 
725, 738–39 (1995). 
39. Id. at 737. 
40. Id. at 737–38. 
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The media stoked the coals even further with its reporting on fraud and 
asylum. For example, the television program, 60 Minutes, aired a segment 
showing individuals destroying their identity documentation upon arrival 
at Kennedy airport in New York in order to seek asylum.41  Even without
any proof of identity, “many were simply released, with work authorization . . .
and few ever appeared for their . . . hearings in immigration court.”42 
Adding to the perfect storm, “several large ships were reported on both
coasts discharging passengers, mostly Chinese, at unauthorized locations. 
The Golden Venture, which ran aground off Long Island in June 1993, 
became the best known smuggler’s vessel.  Many of its desperate passengers
tried to swim to shore,” and those that survived sought asylum.”43  These 
events, and the widespread media attention, had a strong impact on 
lawmakers.
Bills aimed at dramatically revamping the asylum regime began to 
churn through Congress. There were calls for mandatory detention for all
asylum seekers and a requirement that asylum applications be lodged 
within days of entering the country.44  This crisis mentality, and the fear 
that asylum itself was at stake, led some prominent refugee rights advocates 
to support efforts to limit the right to work for asylum seekers.45 
Ultimately, the Clinton Administration acted to address this situation. 
It added more asylum officers and put new provisions in place to reduce 
the backlog of cases and make asylum processing more efficient.46  It also 
bifurcated the process for seeking asylum from that of seeking work
authorization.47  Pursuant to the new regulations, an “asylum clock” would 
start running once the applicant submitted a complete asylum application.48 
The applicant was then required to wait until the clock had registered at 
41. Id. at 738. 
42. Id.
 43. Id.
 44. Bill Frelick, U.S. Detention of Asylum Seekers and Human Rights, MIGRATION 
POL’Y INST. (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/us-detention-asylum-
seekers-and-human-rights [http://perma.cc/F8PE-DTRK].
45. According to David Martin, “the traditional refugee advocacy groups proved
quite willing to engage with the Administration in considering a wide range of reform 
ideas.  Their hope was to head off the scariest of the legislative proposals by showing that 
the genuine problems of the system could be mastered, that abuses could be defeated, by
other means that still preserved a genuine opportunity for asylum for those in real need.” 
Martin, supra note 38, at 738–39. 
46. Ron Fournier, Immigration Curbs Sought—Clinton Seeks To Add Border 
Agents, Speed Asylum Reviews, THE SEATTLE TIMES, July 27, 1993, http://community. 
seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19930727&slug=1712986 [http://perma.cc/L4VY-
ZV9M].
 47. Martin, supra note 38, at 753–54. 
48. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1) (2014). 
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least 150 days before submitting a request for work authorization.49  At
that point, the government had thirty days to consider the work 
authorization application.50  In addition, under the new regulations, “any 
delay requested or caused by the applicant” would stop the clock until 
proceedings were restarted.51  Furthermore, the regulations clarified that an 
asylum seeker would not start to accrue time toward work authorization if he 
or she “fail[ed] to appear for a scheduled interview before an asylum officer
or a hearing before an immigration judge.”52  When Congress dramatically 
altered the immigration landscape in 1996 with its passage of the restrictive
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),
these revised employment authorization regulations for asylum seekers 
officially became law.53 
This reformed immigration regime had a devastating impact on an asylum
seeker’s right to work.  Except in those unusual instances where asylum
was granted sooner, applicants for asylum could no longer secure work 
authorization for at least 180 days after filing their asylum application, and
often much longer if applicants requested an adjournment at any point.54 
IIRIRA is even harsher for applicants who have been denied asylum or 
asylum seekers renewing their work authorization.  If an asylum officer
denies asylum to an applicant previously granted work authorization, that 
authorization terminates sixty days after the denial or upon the expiration of
the authorization, whichever time period is longer.55 If an immigration 
judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, or a federal court denies asylum, 
“employment authorization terminates upon the expiration of the . . .
document,” unless the applicant appropriately appeals.56  A government 
appeal of a grant of asylum does not affect an asylum seeker’s work
49.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2). 
50.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1). 
51.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2). 
52.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4). 
53. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, §§ 401–405, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-655 to -666 (1996); see 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(d)(2) (2012). 
54. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(2) (“Any delay requested or
caused by the applicant shall not be counted as part of these time periods, including delays 
caused by the failure without good cause to follow the requirements for fingerprint processing.”). 
55.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(b)(1) (2014). 
56.  8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(b)(2). 
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authorization eligibility throughout the appeals process.57  An applicant who 
has been denied asylum before receiving work authorization, however, is not 
eligible to apply for work authorization, regardless if the applicant appeals.58 
Perhaps the harshest provision is that an asylum seeker who did not appear
at a scheduled interview or hearing may not even apply for work 
authorization until asylum is granted, unless the applicant can show 
“exceptional circumstances.”59 
B. Pressure Mounts to Ameliorate the Harshest Aspects              
of the New “Asylum Clock” 
Although some prominent advocates involved in the process initially 
accepted the work authorization reforms, believing that this was a way to 
save the asylum regime from being gutted altogether,60 the majority of
comments received in response to the proposed regulatory changes were
quite negative and foresaw the dangers ahead.61  Commentators warned 
of the undue hardship these changes would impose on asylum seekers and 
cited interference with the right to seek asylum and with due process 
guarantees.62 There was also fear of a heightened risk of exploitation, as 
asylum seekers would be pushed into the black market for employment.63 
By 2011, the Ombudsman from the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) recommended changes to the way the 
government managed the asylum clock, including greater transparency
and clearer communication as to the workings of the clock.64  By 2012, a
group of asylum seekers filed a class action against the Department of
Homeland Security, claiming that its policies and practices regarding the 
asylum clock deprived them of the opportunity to obtain employment 
authorization, fair notice of decisions regarding employment authorization, 
57.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(c)(3). 
58.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.7(a)(1). 
59.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4). 
60. Martin, supra note 38, at 743. 
61. Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or
Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 62284, 




 64. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SEC., EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR ASYLUM APPLICANTS: RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
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and a means of correcting erroneous decisions.65  Indeed, the government
statistics showed that the system was not functioning in the way it had 
been envisioned, for example, with asylum seekers waiting no more than 
150 days before being eligible to seek employment authorization—assuming 
there was no delay attributable to the applicant.  Rather, between 2007 
and May 2011, there were 285,101 pending cases before the immigration 
courts.66  Of those pending cases, 262,025 (91.9%) had their employment 
authorization clocks stopped at some point.67 
The hardship such delays cause to asylum seekers has been well 
documented.  In 2010, Penn State Law School’s Center for Immigrants’ 
Rights joined with the American Immigration Council’s Legal Action
Center to issue a comprehensive report detailing problems with the asylum 
clock system and calling for reform.68  In 2013, Seton Hall Law School and 
Human Rights Watch released a human rights report documenting the physical 
and emotional harm that comes with enforced destitution.69 
In April 2013, the government agreed to a settlement in the class action 
litigation challenging the flagrant violations of the asylum clock system.70 
The settlement terms aimed to increase transparency and soften some of the 
harshest aspects of the asylum employment authorization clock. For
example, prior to the settlement, an asylum applicant who failed to appear 
65. Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification at 1–2, 4, A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Serv., No. C11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter A.B.T. 
Motion], available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Asylum 
Clock-Motion-Exhibits-Order-12-20-2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/62ML-2CZU]. 
66. Id. at 9; A.B.T. Motion, exhibit 1, at 2–3. 
67. Id.
 68. See  JESÚS SAUCEDO & DAVID RODRIGUEZ, PENN STATE LAW’S CTR. FOR
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS FOR AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL’S LEGAL ACTION CTR., UP AGAINST THE
CLOCK: FIXING THE BROKEN EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ASYLUM CLOCK 2–3 (2010), 
available at http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/Asylum_Clock_ 
Paper.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PV8-EXWJ]. 
69. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 28.  For example, a Rwandan rape-
survivor recounts the depression that came with not being able to work for years while her
asylum claim was pending.  She explains, “[j]ust sitting on your own, one year, two years,
three years, five, doing nothing, just sitting there, kills you.  I was so depressed.” Id. Other 
asylum seekers spoke of feelings of “worthlessness” and of “being nothing without a work
permit.” Id. at 29.
70. Settlement Agreement at 17–18, A.B.T. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.,
No. C11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2013) [hereinafter A.B.T. Settlement Agreement],
available at http://legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/60-1Settlement%20Agreement.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/LQH3-YKX5].
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for an interview or hearing date would be barred from receiving employment 
authorization during the asylum-seeking process, unless the applicant
could show exceptional circumstances for missing the interview or hearing.71 
Under the terms of the settlement, the government is now required to send
a letter to an applicant who misses an interview or hearing, which notifies
such person about the consequences it has on employment authorization,
and allow forty-five days to demonstrate “good cause” for failing to appear.”72 
Prior to the settlement, asylum seekers appearing in court before an
immigration judge would often find their cases adjourned without
explanation.73  Under the terms of the settlement agreement, judges are
now required to state, on the record, the reasons for adjourning a hearing.74 
Judges must also allow asylum seekers forty-five days before scheduling 
an expedited hearing date—previously, judges only had to allow fourteen
days.75 For the small number of asylum seekers who appeal and win their 
cases, the settlement now requires that the asylum seeker be credited with 
the number of days that elapsed between the initial denial of asylum to the 
date of the order remanding the case.76  While this is an improvement from
the prior system, where none of this time on appeal was counted toward 
employment authorization, asylum seekers will still be left without 
employment authorization until there is a remand, unless they had 
accrued 150 days prior to the appeal.77  Finally, asylum seekers are now
allowed to submit their asylum applications with the court clerk and use
that submission date to start the employment authorization clock—rather than
waiting to submit at the hearing date.78  Although the settlement
agreement ameliorates the lack of transparency and chips away at some of
the most egregious aspects of the asylum clock, it does not address the 
inherent inequities or dangers in conditioning asylum on the refugee’s 
ability to withstand destitution. 
III. ANALYZING ASYLUM REFORM WITHIN THE BROADER CONTEXT OF 
A MORE RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION REGIME 
While the asylum reforms of 1995 and 1996 reduced the backlog in 
cases, there is no evidence to establish that the reduction was attributable 
71.  8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(4) (2014). 
72.  A.B.T. Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, at 17–18. 
73. A.B.T. Motion, supra note 65, at 4. 
74.  A.B.T. Settlement Agreement, supra note 70, at 15. 
75. Id. at 17. 
76. Id. at 19. 
77. See id.
 78. Id. at 16. 
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to the denial of employment authorization to asylum seekers.  Rather, it is 
likely that increasing the number of asylum officers, speeding up the 
processing of asylum claims, and weeding out fraudulent asylum claims 
played a much greater role in reducing the backlog.  In 1995, prior to the 
reforms, “the INS had 325 asylum officers, 149,566 new asylum claims,” 
and a backlog of 457,670 pending cases.79  In 2013, USCIS had fewer
asylum officers than in 1995; even with only 279 asylum officers, USCIS 
received 44,453 new asylum claims and only had a backlog of 32,560 
cases.80  Whereas the ratio of new asylum claims to officers was 693-to-
1, not including the massive backlog of cases; in 1992, the ratio of new 
applicants to officers was down to 159-to-1 in 2013.81 
While the law barring asylum seekers from employment authorization
and governmental benefits has remained frozen in time since its adoption 
in 1996, the broader immigration landscape has dramatically shifted such that
these restrictions have become obsolete.  The reforms have created real
disincentives to filing for asylum as a guise for securing work
authorization.  For example, prior to the employment authorization reforms,
an asylum seeker could apply for asylum and employment authorization 
and work for years while the claim moved slowly through the adjudication 
and appeals process.82  Once the asylum seeker accrued seven years in the
United States, the asylum seeker could seek to suspend deportation if it 
could be shown that deportation would result in extreme hardship to an 
79. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Asylum Cases Filed with
Immigration and Naturalization Service Asylum Officers, Approved, Denied, and Referred
After Interview, by Selected Nationalities, April 1991–September 1995, REFUGEE REP., Dec.
31, 1995, at 12.). 
80. Id. (citing Telephone Interview by Human Rights Watch with David Pilotti, HQ 
Asylum Branch Chief – Mgmt., USCIS (Oct. 11, 2013)). 
81. Id.  Although the asylum offices are currently experiencing significant backlogs,
USCIS is hiring hundreds of additional officers to address the situation. See CHERI ATTIX, AM. 
IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, THE AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM BACKLOG EXPLAINED, 2 (2014), 
available at https://www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/immigrantjustice.org/files/AILA_Explanation 
%20of%20the%20Affirmative%20Asylum%20Backlog_4.2.14.pdf [https://perma.cc/QMB2- 
MFFP]. 
82. As one scholar notes, “[d]uring the late 1990s a queue of appeals to the BIA 
created delays in hearing cases that in turn encouraged some noncitizens to file appeals 
merely for the benefit of delay.” See Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to
Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2006) (citing Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of
Immigration Appeals Procedures (Aug. 23, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2002/08/26/BIARestruct.pdf [http://perma.cc/FNH9-92LD]).
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immediate family member who was a United States citizen or a lawful
permanent resident.83  In 1996, Congress removed this immigration remedy
(known as “Suspension of Deportation”)84 and replaced it with a much 
more limited form of relief known as “Cancellation of Removal.”85  In  
order to be eligible for this more restrictive provision, an asylum seeker
needs to accrue ten years in the United States without being placed in 
removal proceedings.86  Because of the requirement that the immigrant 
accrue ten years prior to being placed in removal proceedings, there is no
longer any incentive to appeal in hopes of accruing time for cancellation of 
removal.87  Congress also changed the showing of hardship to immediate
family if the applicant were deported from “extreme hardship”88 to 
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”89  Finally, the exceptional 
and extremely unusual hardship standard no longer applies to the applicant, 
but only to a United States citizen or to a spouse, parent, or child who is a
lawfully permanent resident.90  All of these statutory changes have
resulted in a more restrictive regime for gaining asylum relief that effectively
blunts any attempt to file for asylum simply for the goal of securing work
authorization.
Congress also implemented a system of expedited removal aimed at 
dramatically reducing the backlog of cases.  Under this system, an
immigration officer stationed at a port of entry is empowered to determine 
whether to quickly remove a person who has improper or no documentation 
or to allow them to seek asylum.91  “If the officer believes that [the person]
does not have a credible fear of persecution,” the officer has the power to
83. See  8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed in 1996); H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
IMMIGRATION IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST ACT OF 1995, H.R. REP. NO. 104–469, pt. 1, at 
122 (1996) (expressing concern that, “[s]uspension of deportation is often abused by aliens
seeking to delay proceedings until 7 years have accrued. This includes aliens who failed 
to appear for their deportation proceedings and were ordered deported in absentia, and
then seek to re-open proceedings once the requisite time has passed. Such tactics are 
possible because some Federal courts permit aliens to continue to accrue time toward the
seven year threshold even after they have been placed in deportation proceedings.”). 
84.  8 U.S.C. § 1254 (1994) (repealed in 1996). 
85.  8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2012). 
86.  § 1229b(b)(1)(A). 
87. See id. 
88.  8 U.S.C. §1254a(e) (2012). 
89.  § 1229b. 
90. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (establishing that “removal would result in exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the 
United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence”). 
91. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HEARING ON “ASYLUM ABUSE: IS IT 
OVERWHELMING OUR BORDERS?” 7 (2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
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“order the [person] removed . . . without further hearing or review.”92 
Credible fear is a lower standard than “well-founded,” which is required 
for a grant of asylum;93 credible fear “means that there is a significant
possibility . . . that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.”94  This 
process was implemented to “target the perceived abuses of the asylum
process by restricting the hearing, review, and appeal process for aliens at
a port of entry.”95 
Moreover, any person with fraudulent or no documentation, who presents
himself or herself to an immigration officer at a port of entry, must be
detained pending the credible fear determination.96  If that person is “found
not to have such a fear,” he or she is removed.97  Mandatory detention thus
makes it easier to monitor persons who purport to seek asylum and then 
remove them from the United States if their pleas for asylum are deemed
not to meet the credible fear standards of asylum law. If, on the other 
hand, an officer or immigration judge concludes that a person does have 
a credible fear of persecution in his or her home country, the person may
be released until the full case is heard before a judge,98 but most often remains 
in detention and must present a claim within those confines.99 
In enacting IIRIRA, Congress made additional revisions to existing law,
which further restricted an asylum seeker’s ability to seek protection. For 
example, Congress imposed a one-year time limit for seeking asylum 
92.  § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). 
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(2012); Asylum in the United States, IMMIGR. POL’Y 
CTR. (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/asylum-united-states 
[http://perma.cc/PBK6-PFW9].
94.  § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). 
95. WASEM, supra note 91, at 7. 
96. WASEM, supra note 91, at 7–8; § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 
97.  § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 
98. WASEM, supra note 91, at 5. 
99. Letter from Robin M. Stutman, Gen. Counsel of U.S. Dep’t of Justice Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review, to Mary Meg McCarthy, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Immigrant 
Justice Ctr, Petition for Rulemaking to Promulgate Regulations Governing Custody 
Determinations for Arriving Alien Asylum Seekers (Mar. 19, 2012) (“The great majority
of aliens who assert a credible fear of persecution or torture are found to have such fear; 
in fiscal year 2009, DHS made positive credible fear findings in 79.7 percent of cases 
involving arriving aliens that proceeded to a decision.”); Credible Fear Workload Report 









    
   
     









   
    
   
   
   
 















protection.100  This seemingly arbitrary temporal limitation on asylum has
been sharply criticized by human rights advocates because it deprives many
deserving refugees of protection.101  In addition, anyone who has traveled
through a “safe-third country” prior to seeking asylum in the United States
is now barred from asylum protection.102  Asylum seekers who have previously 
applied for, but were denied, asylum are also ineligible.103  Finally, if the
Attorney General determines that an asylum seeker submitted a frivolous 
application, the asylum seeker becomes “permanently ineligible for any
[asylum] benefits.”104 
In addition to removing asylum eligibility for refugees who waited over
a year to apply, traveled through a safe third country, were denied protection 
in the past, or previously submitted a fraudulent application, Congress 
dramatically restricted immigration relief more generally and focused
greater resources on heightened enforcement measures.  The IIRIRA 
focused almost exclusively on border security and strengthening interior
enforcement against undocumented immigrants.105  Congress allocated 
a dramatic increase in resources for personnel, physical barriers, and 
technology at the border,106 and authorized additional funding for more
Federal prosecutors, detention facilities, and the actual removal of
undocumented immigrants with removal orders.107  The IIRIRA also 
established a pilot program for employer electronic verification of workers’
identities and work authorizations108 and substantially increased civil and 
criminal penalties for alien smuggling, document and other fraud, as well
as other miscellaneous immigration-related offenses.109 It also created the
three and ten year bars to reentry for immigrants who were previously
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012).  The only exception to this time limit is if the 
applicant can show that there were certain “changed circumstances which materially
affect[ed] the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to
the delay in filing” the asylum application.  § 1158(a)(2)(D).
 101. See, e.g., The Asylum Filing Deadline: Denying Protection to the Persecuted 
and Undermining Governmental Efficiency, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Sept. 2010), http:// 
www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/afd.pdf [http://perma.cc/AYH2-PKHQ].
 102. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8; § 1158(a)(2)(A). That third country must be a
signatory to the Refugee Convention and one with which the United States has a special 
treaty and that would afford the asylum seeker a “full and fair procedure” to determine
asylum eligibility in that country.  § 1158(a)(2)(A). 
103. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8; § 1158(a)(2)(C). 
104. WASEM, supra note 91, at 8–9; § 1158(d)(6). 
105. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
106. Id. §§ 101–12. 
107. Id. §§ 204, 131–34, 385, 386. 
108. Id. §§ 401–05. 
109. Id. §§ 202, 203, 211–20, 321–34. 
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unlawfully present in the United States, expanded the crime-related and
terrorism-related removal grounds, restricted the availability of discretionary
remedies, and narrowed the procedural rights previously applicable in
removal proceedings.110 The Act broadened, and in some circumstances 
mandated, the use of preventive detention in connection with removal 
proceedings.111 
Whereas appealing a denial of asylum in the past often resulted in years of 
employment authorization while the case sat before a backlogged Board of 
Appeals, in 1999 the Board of Immigration Appeals began streamlining
adjudication of appeals.112  In August 2002, the Department of Justice
promulgated new rules aimed at procedural reforms to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals and reducing the backlog of cases.113  The new rules
changed the appeals process so that most cases would be decided by a
single Board member rather than a three-member panel.114  It also allowed
for a single Board member to summarily dismiss an appeal prior to briefing 
or to issue an “affirmance without opinion,” substantially reducing 
the amount of time necessary for issuing decisions.115 
Moreover, since 1996 Congress has enacted additional legislation aimed at
increasing enforcement measures and making immigration laws less 
generous or forgiving. For example, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001,116 which: 
110. Id. §§ 301–58. 
111. Id. § 305. 
112. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Publishes Final Rule for Streamlining
Appeals Process (Oct. 18 1999) (on file with author). 
113. “The preamble to the proposed rules states that the ‘Procedural Reforms’ are 
intended to: (1) eliminate the backlog of approximately 55,000 cases pending before the 
BIA, (2) eliminate unwarranted delays in the adjudication of administrative appeals, (3)
utilize BIA resources more efficiently, and (4) allow more resources to be allocated to the
resolution of those cases that present difficult or controversial legal questions.” DORSEY & 
WHITNEY LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FOR: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
IMMIGRATION POLICY, PRACTICE AND PRO BONO RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: 
PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 20 (2003) (citing Board of 
Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 
7309, 7310 (proposed Feb. 19, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)), available at 
http://www.dorsey.com/files/Upload/DorseyStudyABA.pdf [https://perma.cc/AW9C-K6F6?
type=pdf]. 
114. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 113, at 20.
 115. Id. at 17. 
116.  USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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[B]uilt on previous restrictions and introduced a series of new measures that
broadened terrorism-related grounds for removal, narrowed the possibilities for 
discretionary relief, reinforced border security, expanded detention, and streamlined
the procedures for removing alien terrorists.  Five years later, the REAL ID Act 
of 2005 again expanded grounds of inadmissibility, further restricted judicial 
review in immigration proceedings, prohibited the issuance of driver’s licenses
to undocumented individuals, and mandated various security procedures relating
to applications for drivers’ licenses.  The Secure Fence Act of 2006 bolstered
existing border security measures by mandating 700 miles of fencing along the 
Southern border. . . . Overall, in the years following the attacks of September 11,
2001, Federal laws enacted in the immigration realm have focused almost entirely on
interior enforcement and border security.117 
Not surprisingly, in light of the dramatically increased spending in this 
area, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has carried out a 
record high number of immigrant removals from the United States.118 
If the motive for restricting the right to work was to reduce fraud and 
provide a disincentive to seeking asylum solely to gain employment
authorization, such a restriction is no longer necessary in light of the current
harsh refugee regime.  At the same time, the Executive Branch has focused 
greater resources on enforcement actions and achieved record high numbers
of removals.  In addition, the Board of Immigration Appeals revamped its
processes to streamline decision-making and diminish the backlog of cases.
While in no way condoning the punitive regime facing asylum seekers, 
also forcing poverty upon asylum seekers is immoral and superfluous as 
a means of avoiding fraudulent asylum claims. 
117. BORDER SECURITY, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND IMMIGRATION MODERNIZATION 
ACT, S. REP. NO. 113-40, pt. 1, at 15 (2013) (citations omitted).  Congress has also adopted
other measures to bolster immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, §§ 5101–5204, 118 Stat. 3638, 
3732–35 (containing several border security and immigration enforcement provisions, 
including authorization of an increase of at least 2000 Border Patrol agents and 800 ICE 
agents); Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-347, 120 Stat. 1884; Jamie Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force Act, Pub. 
L. No. 112-205, 126 Stat. 1487 (2012). 
118. Ben Winograd, Clearing up the Controversy over the Number of ICE “Removals,” 
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IV. RESTRICTING EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR ASYLUM 
SEEKERS IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE UNITED STATES’
APPROACH TO OTHER FORMS OF HUMANITARIAN-
BASED RELIEF UNDER DOMESTIC 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
United States immigration law is driven by a number of important and 
at times conflicting policy goals such as family reunification, strengthening 
the economy, protecting the nation’s borders, and providing a safe haven 
for those in need.  As for the latter category, the United States offers
asylum to those fleeing persecution, T visas to those who escape human
trafficking,119 U visas to victims of violent crimes within the United 
States,120 the ability to self-petition for permanent residency for those who
have suffered domestic violence at the hands of an American or lawful 
permanent resident spouse,121 and temporary protected status (TPS) to those
who cannot return home due to natural disaster or civil conflict ravaging 
their countries.122  While domestic law separates victims into particular 
119. A T visa is a non-immigrant visa that provides a way for victims of human 
trafficking to remain in the United States and to assist law enforcement in an investigation. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i) (2012); 28 C.F.R. § 1100.27(a)(3) (2014). 
120. U visas are nonimmigrant visas that allow victims of violent crime to remain in 
the United States and assist in the investigation or prosecution of the crime by law
enforcement.  8 C.F.R. § 214.14(b)(1)–(2) (2014). 
121. The Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of 1994 created a process by which
a battered spouse, child, or parent can obtain legal status by self-petition.  Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, §§ 801–810, 127 Stat. 54, 110– 
18; Battered Spouse, Children & Parents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr. 7,
2011), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spouse-children-parents [https://perma.cc/
T6KQ-XZNT?type=source]; Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Apr.
11, 2008), http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f6141765 
43f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2cac37668c779110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchann 
el=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD [http://perma.cc/LT3F-3STV].  It is 
intended to be used by those victims whose qualifying family member—whether a United
States citizen or lawful permanent resident—was willfully withholding, or threatening to
“withhold legal immigration sponsorship as a tool of abuse.” Id.  Upon a successful grant of a 
VAWA petition, that person—as well as any “derivative child”—will be able to apply for
work authorization.  8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(IV) (2012). 
122. Temporary Protected Status is intended to provide a safe haven for those who 
may not meet the legal definition of refugee but have fled or cannot return to perilous 
conditions in their native countries.  8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012).  Once the USCIS approves 
an application for TPS, the applicant is also granted work authorization for the duration of
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categories, in actuality these distinctions are often artificial as an immigrant
can simultaneously be both a trafficking victim and a refugee or a domestic
violence victim and a victim of a violent crime.  For example, take the 
case of a woman who flees an abusive relationship in Guatemala believing 
she is coming to the United States as a nanny when in actuality she is held 
captive by her employer and not paid for her labor. This immigrant 
woman could seek asylum protection based on the domestic violence she 
suffered in Guatemala and also seek a T visa as a victim of human trafficking 
in the United States.  If she was subjected to domestic violence in the United 
States, she could also seek a U visa for victims of violent crime.  If her 
abuser was also her spouse and a United States citizen or lawful permanent 
resident, she could self-petition for permanent residency.  If her country
was designated for protection while she was in the United States, she 
could also seek TPS. 
United States law allows for employment authorization in all of these 
humanitarian-based situations.  In some of these categories, like TPS, the
processing time is relatively fast so that applicants are not left for long 
without the ability to support themselves.123  In other situations, the
processing can be slow124 or there are limits on how many visas can be
allocated per year.125  In order to address these situations, United States 
law either allows for employment authorization in the interim period (as 
his or her country’s designation as an unsafe state.  LISA SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS20844, TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS: CURRENT IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
ISSUES (2015). 
123. Processing time for employment authorization based on TPS is generally three 
months. See USCIS Processing Time Information for the Vermont Service Center, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (May 12, 2015), https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processing 
TimesDisplay.do [https://perma.cc/SDU6-J5XN]. 
124. For example, applicants for U visas are currently waiting approximately thirteen
months for approval and concomitant employment authorization; T visa applicants are 
currently waiting about four months for approval and employment authorization. Id. 
125. There are only 10,000 U visas available per year, and they are taken very
quickly.  Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-
u-nonimmigrant-status [http://perma.cc/L3YM-2HN7] (last updated Jan. 9, 2014). 
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with U visas),126 or allows for public benefits (as with T visas)127 and 
VAWA petitions.128  Only when it comes to refugees seeking asylum does
126. USCIS may grant conditional work authorization to applicants in excess of the 
10,000 cap if there is a bona fide U visa application pending before USCIS.  8 U.S.C. §
1184(p)(6) (2012).  An application is considered bona fide when USCIS determines that 
it is not fraudulent, is complete and properly filed, contains the requisite certification by
law enforcement, is accompanied by fingerprint and background checks, and “established 
prima facie eligibility for” U visa status.  See SUZANNE B. SELTZER ET AL., NY ANTI-
TRAFFICKING NETWORK, IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR CRIME VICTIMS: THE U VISTA MANUAL A-
iv (2010), available at http://aaldef.org/docs/U-Visa-Manual.pdf [http://perma.cc/NM46-
RQ7U].  Even prior to the full implementation of the U visa program, USCIS took steps 
to ensure that potential U visa applicants would not be left without the ability to work. 
From 2000 until 2009, USCIS granted interim relief, which allowed those individuals who
were U visa-eligible to receive work authorization and additional benefits. USCIS Update:
U Nonimmigrant Interim Relief Recipients Reminded To Apply for U Visa, U.S. CITIZENSHIP 
& IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66
f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=1c4cb1be1ce85210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&v 
gnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD [http://perma.cc/Y27K- 
SPPA] (last updated Dec. 14, 2009).  Upon the interim relief program’s conclusion, benefit
recipients were encouraged to apply for the U visa; those who already had pending applications 
were allowed to continue receiving benefits until their applications were adjudicated. Id. 
127. Victims of human trafficking are afforded an alternative form of temporary
immigration status called “continued presence.”  22 U.S.C. § 7105(c)(3) (2008).  To 
receive continued presence, a law enforcement official must submit an application to the 
Secretary of Homeland Security certifying that a person “is a victim of a severe form of 
trafficking and may be a potential witness to such trafficking,” which would require that 
the person remain in the United States for one year, subject to renewal, to assist in investigation 
and prosecution.  § 7105(c)(3)(A)(i); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Continued 
Presence: Temporary Immigration Status for Victims of Human Trafficking, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (July 2010) [hereinafter Continued Presence], http://www.dhs.gov/
sites/default/files/publications/blue-campaign/BC_Continued_Presence.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
FX2K-AZB2].  Upon a successful grant of continued presence, the person will be able to 
obtain state and federal benefits as well as work authorization.  § 7105(b)(1)(A); Continued
Presence, supra; 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35 (2014). A decision on employment authorization
usually takes three months from the date of application for authorization.  USCIS Processing
Time Information for the Vermont Service Center, supra note 123. 
128. VAWA self-petitioners can receive benefits while their claims are processed. 
See  CECILIA OLAVARRIA ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, PUBLIC 
BENEFITS ACCESS FOR BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND CHILDREN 2 (2013), available 
at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/public-benefits/benefits-for-qualified-immigrants/4.2_
PB_BB-PublBens_for_Imm_Women_and_Children-MANUAL-BB.pdf [http://perma.cc/
T84Y-RYL5].  Indeed, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA) recognized that certain classes of immigrants might be unable to
support themselves and so provided for those “qualified immigrants” to receive certain 
public benefits. Id.  An individual petitioning under VAWA may receive benefits if the 
individual’s application contains a prima facie showing of VAWA eligibility, the individual has
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United States law leave the applicant for prolonged periods of time 
without either the ability to work or access to social services.129  While it
is true that asylum seekers are eligible to seek employment authorization 
after six months, this is only available for those few who have never 
requested additional time to prepare their cases.130  For those who were 
offered a quick asylum interview or hearing, but needed more time to
adequately prepare their case, they are left in limbo without a means to 
survive for an indefinite period. This punitive aspect of United States asylum 
law is inconsistent with other areas of law and places an undue burden on
one sub-category of vulnerable immigrants in need of protection. 
V. THE RESTRICTION ON EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION UNDERMINES 
THE STATUTORY RIGHTS TO SEEK ASYLUM AND TO  
OBTAIN COUNSEL 
Congress enacted the Refugee Act in 1980 in order to give “statutory 
meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian 
concerns.”131  The Refugee Act for the first time created a statutory right 
to seek asylum.132  Although not required to do so pursuant to the Refugee 
been battered or subject to extremely cruel treatment by a United States citizen or lawful
permanent resident, there is a demonstrated connection between the abuse and the necessity of
public benefits, and the individual does not live with his or her abuser.  Interim Guidance 
on Verification of Citizenship, Qualified Alien Status and Eligibility Under Title IV of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 62 Fed. Reg. 
61,344, 61,366 (Nov. 17, 1997).  Those persons who meet the requirements are allowed access
to “federal means-tested public benefits, [other] federal public benefits, and federally funded
social service programs.”  OLAVARRIA ET AL., supra, at 7.
129. Perhaps a reason for allowing broader benefits for T and U visa applicants is 
because they are not solely humanitarian-based.  See Victims of Trafficking and Violence 
Protection Act (T and U Visas), IMMIGR. CENTER FOR WOMEN & CHILDREN, http://icwclaw.
org/services-available/victims-of-trafficking-and-violence-protection-act-t-and-u-visas [http:// 
perma.cc/6984-5EUY] (last visited June 9, 2015).  Rather, T and U visas are also aimed 
at assisting law enforcement in the prosecution of criminals.  Id. However, the VAWA 
self-petition visas are solely humanitarian. See Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for 
Approved Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Self-Petitioners, supra note 121.  Moreover,
asylum seekers sued to be afforded the right to work before it was dramatically curtailed
in 1995. See AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 15. 
130. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
131. Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: 
The Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 
313 (2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 141 (1980)). 
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) provides that, “[a]ny alien who is physically present in
the United States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespective of such alien’s status, 
may apply for asylum in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b)
of this title.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012).  According to David Martin, “It is indeed quite 
plausible to read Congress’s enactment of [section] 208 in 1980 as creating a right for 
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Act of 1980, the INS promulgated regulations allowing for both a right to
counsel—as long as there is no cost to the government or undue delay133 and 
a right to employment authorization in non-frivolous cases—at the
discretion of the District Director.134 
The INS initially retained discretion to decide work authorization requests 
while asylum claims were pending on a case by case basis.135  However, 
in Diaz v. INS, a class of asylum seekers, largely from Central America,
challenged the district director’s use of restrictive criteria to deny or revoke 
work authorization.136  The Court initially noted that “the INS may not
have been required to enact regulations permitting aliens to work while
awaiting a decision on their political asylum applications.”137  However, 
in enjoining the INS from denying employment authorization based on 
restrictive factors, the Court held that once the agency chose to promulgate a
regulation, it had an obligation to follow it.138 
Within a year after the Diaz decision, the INS issued new nondiscretionary 
regulations in 1987, making the right to seek work authorization nearly
automatic for refugees seeking asylum.139  Noting the significance of the
new nondiscretionary employment authorization procedure, David Martin 
advised: 
If work authorization is now to be denied, any lawyer for the Department of 
Justice is bound to be asked in court how the government expects asylum seekers to
survive during the months (and possibly years) until a final ruling is obtained on
the application.  Unless the government takes further steps to provide for such
persons physically present in the United States to have their asylum claims heard on the 
merits.”  David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 
Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1374 (1990). 
133. See infra note 144 and accompanying text. 
134. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
135. The applicable regulations provided that “[a]ny alien who has filed a non-
frivolous application for asylum pursuant to Part 208 of this chapter may be granted 
permission to be employed for the period of time necessary to decide the case.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 109.1(b)(2) (1986).  Section 208.4 provided that “[u]pon the filing of a non-frivolous I-
589, the district director may, in his discretion, grant a request by the applicant for
employment authorization.”  8 C.F.R. § 208.4 (1986) (cited by Diaz v. INS, 684 F. Supp. 
638, 646 (E.D. Cal. 1986)). 
136. Diaz, 648 F. Supp. at 641. 
137. Id. at 647. 
138. Id. (citing Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 746 F.2d 466, 474 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
139. Control of Employment of Aliens, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,216, 16,221 (May 1, 1987) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 274a); Martin, supra note 132, at 1374. 
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people during the pendency of the claim, the lawyer has no respectable answer.
Courts might easily conclude that the government was trying to starve people out 
of pursuing a congressionally mandated right. And they would surely point out 
that a no-work authorization policy falls as heavily on bona fide refugees as on
the abusers who are the ostensible targets.140 
Notwithstanding Martin’s admonition, the INS changed course in 1995 
and instituted the present policy of disallowing work authorization for at
least 180 days.141  During this period, the United States does not “take[]
further steps to provide for such people . . .” arguably leaving a government 
lawyer in the same unanswerable position as Martin hypothesized about in 
1990.142  The current bar on employment authorization for at least six months
is indeed an attempt to “starve people out of pursuing a congressionally 
mandated right.”143 
As noted, Congress has also provided a right to counsel in immigration
proceedings, so long as there is no cost to the government or undue 
delay.144  In recognition of the intricacy of asylum law and the difference
that having a lawyer can make in the process, the asylum application itself 
contains the following admonition: “Immigration law concerning asylum 
and withholding of removal or deferral of removal is complex.  You have a
right to provide your own legal representation at an asylum interview and
during immigration proceedings before the Immigration Court at no cost
to the U.S. government.”145  Indeed, studies have shown that having 
counsel dramatically increases the likelihood of prevailing in an asylum
claim.146 Unfortunately, there are extremely limited options for obtaining 
free legal representation in asylum cases.147 
140. Martin, supra note 132, at 1374 (citations omitted).  Martin also warned that, 
“At times of heavy influx, a policy of near-automatic work authorizations may well be 
ended, but the government must then provide alternative arrangements for feeding and 
housing the asylum seekers.”  Id. 
141.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012). 
142. Martin, supra note 132, at 1374. 
143. Id. 
144.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.10 (2014). 
145. See I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, Instructions, 
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Dec. 29, 2014), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/
files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf [http://perma.cc/BX3F-KD7C].
 146. See e.g., Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Hamutal Bernstein, Improving Immigration
Adjudications Through Competent Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 55 (2008)
(finding that “asylum seekers represented by counsel were three times more likely to
succeed in their claim than pro se applicants”).
147. Under 45 C.F.R. § 1626.3, recipients of Legal Services Corporation (LSC) 
funds “may not provide legal assistance for or on behalf of an ineligible alien.”  45 C.F.R. §
1626.3 (2014). This applies also to any non-LSC funds that LSC-funded institutions could
use. See id.  There is an exception to this, termed the Kennedy Amendment Provision, which 
“permits LSC recipients to use non-LSC funds to provide legal assistance to ineligible aliens 
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Because the likelihood of securing a pro bono lawyer is so remote, the 
bar on employment authorization results in a de facto bar on representation 
by counsel.  Given the complexity of asylum law, undermining the ability to
afford a lawyer dramatically decreases the likelihood of gaining asylum.
If the statutory right to seek asylum is to have any real meaning, the United
States should either provide free counsel or allow asylum seekers to work 
so they can hire lawyers. 
VI. IMPOSING DESTITUTION ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IS CONTRARY TO 
THE SPIRIT OF THE REFUGEE CONVENTION AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 
AND CONVENTIONS 
A. Denying Access to Employment and Benefits Can Rise to a Level of 
Constructive Refoulement as Prohibited by the      
Refugee Convention 
In addition to undermining the statutory right to seek asylum and obtain
counsel, denying refugees the ability to work, without providing any
alternative way to provide for the costs of living while seeking asylum,
threatens to eviscerate the very essence of the Refugee Convention.
Although the Refugee Convention does not explicitly require signatory
states to provide for the right to work for asylum seekers, failing to
provide asylum seekers with any lawful means of basic sustenance for at 
least six months undermines the ability to seek protection, which is at the 
core of the Refugee Convention.  International law precludes state parties 
from attaching reservations or understandings that undermine the purpose 
of the treaty or convention being ratified.148  As a state party to the U.N. 
who are the victims of domestic abuse when the legal assistance is ‘directly related to the
prevention of, or obtaining relief from,’ the abuse.”  Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens,
62 Fed. Reg. 19,409, 19,410 (Apr. 21, 1997) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 1626). 
148. See Leo R. McIntyre III, Comment, Of Treaties and Reservations: The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Juvenile Death Penalty in 
the United States, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 147, 155–56 (2003) (citing Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VV9Y-T579]).  Another fundamental tenet of international law is that if a
reservation to a treaty is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty, it will be found
invalid.  Vienna Convention, supra (“A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, 
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Protocol on Refugees, the United States must act consistently with the
spirit of the Convention. By enacting a set of laws and adopting policies 
that simultaneously preclude those who come forward to seek refugee status 
from any lawful means of economic survival for at least six months, the
United States is undermining the purpose of the Refugee Convention and 
constructively refouling those who cannot sustain themselves. 
The Refugee Convention provides that, “[n]o Contracting State shall 
expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion.”149 This obligation is not limited solely to 
recognized refugees, but applies to asylum seekers as well.150 
The question is whether compelling asylum seekers to live in destitution 
for a minimum of six months—most often for much greater periods—and 
making it almost impossible for them to afford lawyers essentially forces
them to return to their home countries and thus, amounts to constructive 
refoulement under the Refugee Convention.  James Hathaway has remarked
that “[i]n some cases, depriving refugees of the necessities of life may 
give rise to a breach of the duty of non-refoulement. Repatriation under 
coercion, including situations in which refugees are left with no real option
but to leave, is in breach of Art. 33 of the Refugee Convention.”151 The
United Nations High Commission on Refugees has also noted that States
limit socio-economic opportunities for refugees in order to “promote early
repatriation.”152 Although there is a paucity of scholarly literature discussing 
approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation is 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”).
149. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, G.A. Res. 429 (V), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.2/108, at 29 (July 28, 1951) available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 
html [http://perma.cc/CQN4-PFNL]. 
150. See Ryszard Cholewinski, Enforced Destitution of Asylum Seekers in the United
Kingdom: The Denial of Fundamental Human Rights, 10 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 462, 487
(1998).
 151. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
464 (2005). See also Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, A Waste 
of Humanity, WORLD REFUGEE SURV., 2004, at 38–39, available at http://www.uscri 
refugees.org/2010Website/5_Resources/5_5_Refugee_Warehousing/5_5_3_Translations 
/Warehousing_Refugees_A_Denial_of_Rights.pdf [http://perma.cc/7XGX-4U72] (arguing that 
denial of necessary socio-economic support to refugees constitutes constructive refoulement 
under international law). 
152. U.N. High Comm’r on Refugees, Global Consultations on International 
Protection, Local Integration, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. EC/GC/02/6 (Apr. 25, 2002), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3ccd64536.pdf [http://perma.cc/3HYD-YM6Y] (last accessed June
9, 2015). 
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what constitutes constructive refoulement under the Refugee Convention, 
various international tribunals have interpreted the term. 
For example, in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) was faced with a claim of constructive refoulement
based upon Italy’s action in intercepting and forcibly pushing a boat of 
Somalian and Eritrean asylum seekers, who had fled from Libya in hopes 
of seeking asylum in Italy, back to Libya.153 In ruling that Italy’s actions
in intercepting and pushing back the asylum seekers to Libya (a country 
that was not even a signatory to the Refugee Convention) were in clear
violation of the protection against refoulement, the ECHR based its decision 
upon the doctrine of constructive refoulement.154 
In Regina v. Secretary of State for Social Security, the United Kingdom 
Court of Appeal struck down regulations that excluded any asylum seeker 
who did not lodge an application upon entry to the United Kingdom from
accessing previously available economic benefits.155  The Court gave
weight to the concerns of the United Nations High Commission on 
Refugees [UNHCR] that:
[A]sylum seekers may be forced into unlawful exploitative conditions to support 
themselves whilst exercising their appeal rights. It is difficult to speculate on the 
range of illegal activities that increasingly desperate persons may resort to, but
these are likely to include unlawful employment, dishonesty offences and perhaps
more serious criminality involving drugs, prostitution or violent crimes.156 
In the UNHCR’s opinion, “this could amount to ‘constructive refoulement’ 
and may place the United Kingdom in violation of its obligations under 
the Refugee Convention.”157  In striking down the regulations, the Court
concluded that, “the Regulations necessarily contemplate for some a life 
so destitute that to my mind no civilized nation can tolerate it.”158 The
Court aptly noted the Hobsian choice facing asylum seekers: “[T]he need
153.  Jamaa v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., 97, 107. 
154. Id. at 154. 
155. R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 293 (Eng.). 
156. Id. at 289.  The Court explained that “[s]uch activity could bring them into
conflict with the law and undermine the delicate balance of reciprocity that exists between
the State offering asylum and the asylum-seeker.  Confronted with these choices even
genuine but desperate refugees might be compelled to return to face persecution in the
country of origin, rather than remain in an impossible position in the United Kingdom.” Id.
 157. Id.
 158. Id. at 292. 
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either to abandon their claims to refugee status or alternatively to maintain
them as best they can but in a state of utter destitution.”159 
Furthermore, while silent on the issue of socioeconomic rights for 
asylum seekers, the Refugee Convention does generally mandate a broad 
spectrum of socio-economic rights for refugees. For example, Article 17 
guarantees “lawfully staying” refugees “the right to wage-earning 
employment” (with the most favorable terms afforded to nationals of other
countries).160  The Refugee Convention also guarantees “lawfully staying”
refugees additional socio-economic rights including the right to housing161 
and to social security.162  The question is whether the term “lawfully 
staying” can be interpreted to include asylum seekers.
Some refugee scholars interpret lawful presence as implying “admission in
accordance with the applicable immigration law, for a temporary purpose, 
for example, as a student, visitor, or recipient of medical attention.”163 
However, at least one prominent refugee scholar has argued that once an
asylum seeker lodges an application for asylum, the asylum seeker should 
be considered to be in lawful presence. According to Hathaway, “lawful
presence is an intermediary category which occupies the ground between
illegal presence on the one hand, and a right to stay on the other.”164 
Independent experts have also concluded: 
The meaning of the term ‘lawful’ must be ascertained in accordance with a good faith
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and in light of human rights treaties
that protect rights on the basis of physical presence and the premise of equality.
If a refugee’s presence in the territory of a state party to the Convention is not
unlawful, in that the state is aware, or should be aware, of the refugee’s presence 
and the state is unable or unwilling to remove the refugee, then the refugee’s 
presence may be regarded as lawful for purposes of the Refugee Convention.165 
While asylum seekers are not generally considered to be lawfully staying 
for purposes of the rights to employment, housing, or social security under 
the Refugee Convention, an argument can be made that asylum seekers who 
159. Id. at 293. 
160.  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 149, at 22. 
161. Id. at 23. 
162. Id. at 24–25. 
163. GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 11, at 524.  The authors note that 
Canada, in its reservation to Articles 23 and 24, stated that “it interprets lawfully staying
as referring only to refugees admitted for permanent residence; refugees admitted for
temporary residence are to be accorded the same treatment with respect to those articles
as is accorded to visitors generally.” Id. at 526 n.105. 
164. HATHAWAY, supra note 151, at 183. 
165. PENELOPE MATHEW, REWORKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASYLUM AND 
EMPLOYMENTS 81 (2012) (citing Colloquium, The Michigan Guidelines on the Right To
Work, 31 MICH. J.  INT’L L. 293, 298 (2010)). 
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are forced to wait months or years for a determination on their asylum
applications should be deemed lawfully staying and entitled to the more 
robust protections afforded to these longer-term refugees.166 
1. United Nations Convention Against Torture 
As a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the 
United States is obligated under Article 3 not to return anyone to a country
“where there are substantial grounds for believing that individual would 
be . . . subject[] to torture.”167 The only way to apply for protection under
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture is to apply for asylum.168 
Under United States immigration law, an application for asylum is
automatically considered also to be an application for protection under 
the Convention Against Torture (also known as the Torture Convention).169 
The same rules apply in terms of not being entitled to public benefits or
authorized to work for at least 180 days.170 Therefore, by depriving those
who fear torture or the ability to survive while their claims proceed, the 
United States may also be engaged in constructive return in violation of
its obligations under the Torture Convention.
B. Interpretations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
Although the United States has not ratified the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), it nevertheless 
provides a useful lens for examining the human rights violations inherent in
166. Asylum seekers who have lodged applications are normally considered to be
“lawfully present” rather than “lawfully staying” as the latter designation contemplates a 
more significant duration and purpose than a period of lawful presence. MATHEW, supra 
note 165, at 87. 
167. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Convention Against Torture]. 
168. See I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, Instructions, 
supra note 145. 
169. Id.
 170. Asylum and Withholding of Removal Relief: Convention Against Torture








    
 




     







   
   
  
    
 
 
keeping asylum seekers in a state of destitution. Under the ICESCR, 
member states must ensure that everyone has the same right to an adequate
standard of living, including the right to work, the right to adequate health 
care, and the right to social security.171  If a member state, through direct 
discrimination or omission, fails to uphold these rights for asylum seekers, it 
may be in violation of its obligations under the ICESCR.  In addition, the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
clarified that a member state breaches its obligations under the ICESCR 
when it changes policy and legislation in such a way as to cause a “decline
in living and housing conditions” beyond minimum standards.172 
C. The European Court on Human Rights and the Right to Be Free of 
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
The European Court of Human Rights is developing an important body of 
jurisprudence in cases alleging that a state’s failure to provide adequate 
employment opportunities and subsistence benefits to asylum seekers
constitutes inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment as proscribed 
by Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.  While there 
is no positive obligation on the State to ensure that everyone has adequate 
housing and sufficient resources to survive, the Court has recognized asylum 
seekers as a particularly vulnerable group deserving of greater protections.173 
The Court has also distinguished between the lack of a positive duty to 
ensure that all have adequate resources and situations in which the state’s
laws or policies create a situation of destitution for asylum seekers. For
example, in Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex 
parte Limbuela, an asylum seeker challenged legislation that prohibited
the Secretary of State from providing accommodations and basic economic 
support to refugees who did not immediately seek asylum.174  The legislation 
similarly barred such asylum seekers from working to support themselves.175 
The House of Lords held that placing asylum seekers who did not apply
right away in a state of destitution by denying them welfare benefits, the
171. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 6(1), 9,
12, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
172. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 
No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing, P11, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (Dec. 13, 1991). 
173. See R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 289 (Eng.). 
174. R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t ex parte Limbuela, [2005] UKHL 66,
[2006] 1 A.C. 396 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.), available at http://www.escr-net.org/ 
sites/default/files/Decision%20Limbuela%20%28en%20ingles%29.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
CG7A-KD6C].
 175. Id. at 2. 
344 
NESSEL FINAL FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 7/28/2015 1:58 PM  
  
       
 
 






   






   
 
 
          
        





[VOL. 52:  313, 2015] Deliberate Destitution as Deterrent
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
right to work, and access to other forms of social support violated Article 3.176 
As Lord Bingham explained: 
[T]reatment is inhumane or degrading if, to a seriously detrimental extent, it 
denies the most basic needs of any human being . . . A general public duty to 
house the homeless or provide for the destitute could not be spelled out of Article
3. But I have no doubt that the threshold may be crossed if a person with no
means and no alternative sources of support, unable to support himself, is, by the 
deliberate action of the state, denied shelter, food or the most basic necessities of 
life.”177 
Similarly, in M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece, the European Court of Human
Rights assessed the state’s role in creating a situation in which vulnerable 
asylum seekers were left destitute.178  As explained by the Court:
the Greek authorities have not had due regard to the applicant’s vulnerability as
an asylum seeker and must be held responsible, because of their inaction, for the
situation in which he has found himself for several months, living in the street, 
with no resources or access to sanitary facilities, and without any means of
providing for his essential needs.179 
The Court noted that the applicant had “been the victim of humiliating 
treatment showing a lack of respect for his dignity and that this situation . . .
without doubt, aroused in him feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority
capable of inducing desperation.”180  The Court concluded that “such living 
conditions, combined with the prolonged uncertainty in which [the applicant]
remained and the total lack of any prospects of his situation improving, 
have attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of 
Article 3 of the Convention.181 
Similarly, in R v. Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Joint 
Consul for the Welfare of Immigrants, the Judge cautioned that,
“[p]arliament cannot have intended a significant number of genuine
asylum seekers to be impaled on the horns of so intolerable a dilemma:
176. Id. at 3. 
177. Id. at 4. As explained by Lord Bingham, treatment must reach a minimum level of
severity in order to be proscribed by Article 3. Id.  Moreover, when the treatment at issue does
not involve “deliberate infliction of pain or suffering, the threshold is a high one.” Id. 
178.  M.S.S. v. Belg. & Greece, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93 (2011). 
179. Id. at 53. 
180. Id.
 181. Id. 
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the need to either abandon their claims to refugee status or alternatively 
to maintain them as best they can but in a state of utter destitution.”182 
In R (on the application of Q) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, the Court once again found that excluding destitute asylum 
seekers from governmental assistance violated Article 3’s prohibition 
against inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment.183  As the Court
explained: 
It is clear that there is no duty on a state to provide a home. It may even be that 
there is no duty to provide any form of social security.  But the situation here is 
different since asylum seekers are forbidden to work and so cannot provide for
themselves. Unless they can find friends or charitable bodies or persons, they
will indeed be destitute.  They will suffer at least damage to their health.184 
In the United States, even if the system functioned perfectly, asylum 
seekers would be forced to survive without working or accessing any
public benefits until at least six months after they file for asylum.185  Based
on the jurisprudence interpreting Article 3’s prohibition on inhumane or
degrading treatment or punishment, it seems unlikely that a six-month bar 
would be considered a per se violation.  However, in cases involving a 
particularly traumatized individual or applicants without any charitable 
assistance, a six-month period of destitution might well constitute the type of
dehumanizing treatment prohibited under the European Convention on
Human Rights. Moreover, the reality is that asylum seekers in the United 
States most often endure much longer periods of time without access to
employment or benefits.  Based on the jurisprudence from the ECHR and the
United Kingdom, the longer the period of deprivation of a means of
support, the more likely it constitutes inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment. 
VII. DENYING A RIGHT TO WORK IS PARTICULARLY HARSH FOR 
ASYLUM SEEKERS WHO ARE ALSO DENIED ACCESS TO
PUBLIC BENEFITS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 
The confluence of immigration, public benefits, and health care laws and 
policies in the United States leaves asylum seekers outside of the realms 
of both gainful employment and public benefits. In addition to being 
182. R v. Sec’y of State for Soc. Sec. ex parte Joint Council for the Welfare of 
Immigrants, [1997] 1 W.L.R. 275 (A.C.) at 293 (Eng.). 
183. R ex rel. Q v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 195 
(Eng.).
 184. Id. 
185.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(2) (2012). 
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prohibited from working for at least 180 days, asylum seekers in the United 
States are also barred from receiving federal public benefits.186  The illusive
safety net remains out of reach for asylum seekers without employment
authorization, even when it comes to buying subsidized health insurance 
through the Affordable Care Act.187  While a handful of states provide
social services to needy asylum seekers, the vast majority do not, leaving 
asylum seekers in an extremely vulnerable situation.188 
Countries around the world are searching for ways to deter asylum 
seekers, and some impose wait times for employment authorization that 
are as long, if not longer, than in the United States.189  For example, even
the new European Union Directive, which is scheduled to come into effect in
July 2015, will only guarantee that asylum seekers have access to the labor 
market “no later than 9 months from the date when the application for 
186. 8 U.S.C. §1611(a) (2012).  The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) includes asylum seekers within the definition of 
non-qualified immigrants who are explicitly excluded from social benefits.  See Karina 
Fortuny & Ajay Chaudry, Overview of Immigrants’ Eligibility for SNAP, TANF, MEDICAID, 
and CHIP, ASPE ISSUE BRIEF, Mar. 2012, available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/ 
ImmigrantAccess/Eligibility/ib.pdf [http://perma.cc/5KVC-95SX]. 
187. Only those asylum seekers with employment authorization are considered to be
lawfully present under the Affordable Care Act.  See “Lawfully Present” Individuals
Eligible under the Affordable Care Act, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (Sept. 2012), available 
at http://www.nilc.org/lawfullypresent.html [http://perma.cc/5JQL-B84N].
188. Only California, Hawaii, Minnesota, New York, and Washington allow asylum
seekers to access social benefits through the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
(TANF) program.  Fortuny & Chaudry, supra note 186, at 4.  Although sixteen states and
the District of Columbia provide some state-funded health assistance to particular sub-
groups of asylum seekers, such as the elderly or children, most asylum seekers are precluded
from coverage.  Tanya Broder & Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant Eligibility for
Federal Programs, NAT’L IMMIGR. L.  CENTER (last revised Oct. 2011), available at http:// 
www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html [http://perma.cc/ QQH5-537D].
189. However, some nations allow for an immediate right to work.  For example, 
Greece permits almost immediate access to the labor market (after the initial interview, 
which is supposed to occur within two months from filing the asylum application).
MATHEW, supra note 165, at 27.  With the exception of unskilled or farm labor, however, 
preference in employment is given to Greeks, EU nationals, recognized refugees or persons of
Greek descent. Id. In Spain, asylum seekers can work for six months after applying for 
asylum.  Id. at 28.  In Portugal, asylum seekers can work once a decision on admissibility 
is made, which must occur within twenty days of filing the application.  Id. Austria permits
asylum seekers to work or be self-employed three months after applying for asylum.
However, in practice, only seasonal employment is permitted. Id.  Self-employment as a paper
boy is also allowed, as is prostitution and work in reception centers for those who are 
detained there. Id. 
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international protection was lodged if a first instance decision by the 
competent authority has not been taken and the delay cannot be attributed
to the applicant.”190 
Outside of the European Union, some nations impose even greater wait
times before asylum seekers are permitted to work.  For example, in the United
Kingdom, asylum seekers can only seek employment authorization after a
year if there has been no delay attributable to the asylum seeker and the
employment is limited to sectors with a labor shortage.191 Asylum seekers
in the United Kingdom are also not allowed to be self-employed or start a
business.192  Slovenia permits access to the labor market after nine months, as
long as identity can be established and delay is not attributable to the asylum
seeker.193 
While many countries impose wait times on the right to work for asylum 
seekers, the United States stands alone in simultaneously denying access to
social benefits and leaving asylum seekers in an enforced state of
destitution. For example, when the European Union implements its new 
Directive in July 2015, it will require states to provide financial and social 
benefits consistent with international human rights law.194  Article 17 of 
the Reception Directive guarantees financial social assistance and access 
to health care.195 The United Kingdom permits asylum seekers to obtain 
benefits such as free health care, legal counsel, and housing if they establish 
financial need.196 
In Australia, mandatory detention and a policy of deterrence predominate
when it comes to unauthorized asylum seekers. Those asylum seekers that 
arrive lawfully in Australia may be allowed a bridging visa in order to 
work. However, boat arrivals can only seek a Bridging Visa E that
requires a “compelling need to work.”197  But even here, in the context of a
more restrictive legal framework for seeking asylum, the Australian
government, working with the Red Cross, uses a number of programs to
190. Council Directive 2013/33/EU, art.15, 2013 O.J. (L 180) 96, 104 (effective July
2015), available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/51d29db54.html [http://perma.cc/85NP-
6TUN].
 191. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 27. 
192. Id.
 193. Id. at 27.  In Cyprus, employment is allowed after an asylum application has 
been pending for six months, but only in high-demand sectors such as “garbage collection,
cleaning and food delivery.” Id.  In Belgium, asylum seekers can seek a special work 
permit after six months of a pending asylum application. Id. at 28.
 194. See Council Directive 2013/33/EU, supra note 190. 
195. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 26. 
196. Benefits & Credits: Asylum Support, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/asylum-
support/print [https://perma.cc/ZWD6-EYYS].
 197. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 33. 
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provide “medical care, immigration advice and financial assistance.”198 
In New Zealand, non-detained asylum seekers may be issued a work 
permit, and if they “cannot find work, social assistance and access to some 
health services is available.”199  In Canada, asylum seekers who cannot 
support themselves without working may apply for a work permit.200  Social
assistance is also available to asylum seekers, such as social security,
healthcare and legal representation.201 
In addition to recognizing that asylum seekers must be afforded benefits if
they are not permitted to work, courts have also assessed the constitutionality of
providing less support to asylum seekers than to citizens.  For example, in
2012, the Federal Constitutional Court in Germany faced a challenge to 
the disparity between benefits allowed to asylum seekers as compared
with citizens.202  Germany reduced the amount of cash assistance available
by fifteen percent in an effort to avoid attracting asylum seekers.203  The 
Court held that it was unconstitutional for Germany to allocate cash
benefits to asylum seekers that were “insufficient to guarantee a dignified 
minimum existence.”204  In ordering the German government to increase its
cash allocations to asylum seekers, the Court relied on the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights to hold that “[h]uman
dignity may not be relativized by migration-policy considerations.”205 
198. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 47. 
199. MATHEW, supra note 165, at 34. 
200. Id. at 35. 
201. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 46.  However, refugee claims from 
countries that Canada deems safe “cannot apply for work permits while their cases are 
being processed.”  Number of Asylum Claimants Plummeting in Canada, CTV NEWS (Feb. 21,
2013), http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/number-of-asylum-claimants-plummeting-in-canada-
1.1166984# [http://perma.cc/YV2D-LWCM]. 
202. See Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court in the Proceeding 1 BvL 
10/10, ESCR-NET, http://www.escr-net.org/node/364979 [http://perma.cc/77Q4-JU6E] 
(last visited May 15, 2015). 
203. Today’s Front Pages, VOXEUROP (July 19, 2012), http://www.voxeurop.eu/ 
en/content/todays-front-pages/2374811-todays-front-pages [http://perma.cc/F9YX-734E]. 
204. Judgment of 18 July 2012 - 1 BvL 10/10, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2012/07/ls201 
20718_1bvl001010en.html [http://perma.cc/9MSP-D3PV] (last visited June 9, 2015). 
205. Id. 
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VIII. DENYING THE RIGHT TO EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION 
UNDERMINES IMPORTANT PUBLIC POLICY GOALS 
In addition to the moral and human rights-based arguments that focus 
on the rights of the asylum seeker, there are also strong arguments to be
made that allowing asylum seekers to work benefits the host country. For 
example, studies show that allowing refugees and asylum seekers to work 
facilitates assimilation, and furthers a sense of self-sufficiency for the 
asylum seeker or refugee.206  It is for this very reason that the United States
encourages refugees to work upon arrival.  As explained by the U.S.
Department of State, “Based on years of experience, the U.S. refugee 
resettlement program has found that people learn English and begin to
function comfortably much faster if they start work soon after arrival.”207 
This is equally true for asylum seekers who have not yet been formally
recognized as refugees.
In contrast, requiring asylum seekers to remain idle may well lead to
societal costs. In most countries, when the government prohibits asylum
seekers from supporting themselves, it assumes the role of providing for 
them.208  For countries like the United States, which prohibit work and fail to
provide benefits, asylum seekers are left with little alternative but to work 
illegally.209  Encouraging entrance into the black market leads to 
exploitation by unscrupulous employers as well as depression of wages 
and working conditions for all workers.210 
Tribunals around the world have focused on the connection between 
dignity and the right to work in the context of asylum seekers. In a recent 
case in South Korea, an asylum seeker, with a deportation order for violating a
law that restricted asylum seekers from working for the first year after
filing an asylum claim, brought suit against the head of the Seoul Immigration 
Office.211  In granting the asylum seeker’s challenge and canceling the
deportation order, the Judge explained: 
206. For example, a 2004 study on refugees and social exclusion in Australia discusses
how poverty contributes to social exclusion of refugees.  Janet Taylor, Refugees and Social 
Exclusion: What the Literature Says, 36 MIGRATION ACTION, no. 2, 2004, at 16, 16–31. 
207. The Reception and Placement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/ 
j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm [http://perma.cc/DGG4-QFGB] (last visited Feb. 
27, 2015). 
208. See, e.g., supra notes 193–201 and accompanying text. 
209. AT LEAST LET THEM WORK, supra note 2, at 24. 
210. Id. at 33–35; Lori A. Nessel, Undocumented Immigrants in the Workplace: The 
Fallacy of Labor Protection and the Need for Reform, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 345 
(2001).
 211. Migrants and Refugees, GONGGAM HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FOUNDATION, 
http://www.kpil.org/opboard/viewbody.php?code=eRefugees&page=1&id=16&number=16
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The Korean government did not provide any financial support for refugee applicants. 
When it prohibits all work under these circumstances, the survival of refugee 
applicants has to depend on the goodwill of philanthropic organizations or non-
governmental organizations for refugees.  This policy runs against the spirit of the 
Constitution of a civilized country, which should protect the dignity of humans
and ensure their right to survival.212 
The Judge also noted that by ordering deportation on the basis of the
plaintiff working outside of the permitted period, the Immigration Office 
“ignored the dignity of refugee applicants as humans and only emphasized
the administrative consistency and expediency.”213 According to the Judge, 
“[t]his act is illegal, because the harm that it does to the plaintiff is
significantly greater than the public benefit that it achieves.”214 
Regarding concerns about the abuse of the refugee application process, 
the Court responded that the lengthy waiting period should not be used as a
reason to disadvantage refugee applicants, as one of its main causes is
delay on the part of the administration: 
This problem should be solved by hiring more examiners, shortening the time it 
takes for the refugee status determination process, or setting up complementary
instruments to remove the benefits of abusing the refugee application process.  If
the government assumes that all refugee applicants are not refugees until they are 
recognized, and prevents them from working without providing them with
financial support, it practically neglects its obligation to protect refugees of good
standing. Justice delayed is justice denied.215 
The Court emphasized that it is a fundamental issue “that exceptions to 
the principle of non-refoulement must be very strictly applied.”216 
In contrast, in Minster of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal of South Africa distinguished between the right to work
as a means of self-fulfillment and the right to work as the sole means to 
survive.217  Although the Court equated the right to work as a means of
&keyfield=&keyword=&category=&BoardType=&admin= [http://perma.cc/Z5ZU-X3GA] 





 216. Id. 
217. The appellant in this case was a widowed asylum seeker who needed to work 
in order to provide for herself and her 20 year old disabled son who had fled with her from
their native country.  Minister of Home Affairs v. Watchenuka 2004 (1) All SA 21 (SCA) (S.
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fulfillment with the paramount right to human dignity at the heart of the 
Constitution, it held that even such essential human rights could be
curtailed in appropriate circumstances under the constitution of South 
Africa.218  But, even so, the Court went on to state that “where employment 
is the only reasonable means for the person’s support . . . [at] issue is not 
merely a restriction upon the person’s capacity for self-fulfillment, but a 
restriction upon his or her ability to live without positive humiliation or
degradation.”219 
In addition, the denial of work authorization in the United States results 
in a denial of critical public benefits.220  For example, an asylum seeker 
with work authorization is eligible to buy into subsidized health insurance 
under the exchanges set up through the Affordable Care Act.221  By denying 
work authorization to asylum seekers, the United States is interfering with
the ability to purchase health insurance, which violates the human right to 
health and results in a commensurate cost to society.222 
IX. THE UNITED STATES POLICY OF DELIBERATE DESTITUTION 
FURTHER TRAUMATIZES A VULNERABLE POPULATION   
IN NEED OF PROTECTION 
The importance of being able to work cannot be disputed.  The inability to
work results in a commonly shared experience of feeling devalued by
being denied the opportunity to earn a living as well as the opportunity for 
dignity and worth that work provides. Refugees often suffer from depression 
and other mental health problems as a result of the trauma they have
endured in their home countries and the dangers that come with fleeing 
and attempting to access a safe country.223  The mental stress and anguish for
Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/2003/142.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 2G6Q-
V4DW].
218. The Judge held that, based on notions of sovereignty and self-preservation, South
Africa was entitled, through its constitution, to limit the right to dignity “so as to exclude 
from its scope a right on the part of every applicant for asylum to undertake employment— 
a limitation that is implied by . . .the Refugees Act, and that has been expressed in the 
Standing Committee’s decision.” Id. at 13–14. 
219. Id. at 14. 
220. Immigration Status and the Marketplace, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.
gov/immigrants/immigration-status/ [https://perma.cc/KY6J-C2K9] (last visited June 9, 
2015).
 221. Id.
 222. See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What 
Does This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34 IND. L.  REV. 1457 (2001) (elaborating on
the basis for asserting a right to health under international human rights law). 
223. It is well understood that “[s]urvivors of torture often suffer from complex 
posttraumatic stress that manifests itself as anxiety, distrust, depression, flashbacks, intrusive 
352 
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refugees is often so severe that they consider returning home
notwithstanding the danger that awaits them.224 
Such conditions are compounded by a system in which asylum seekers 
are forced to live in isolation and poverty.225  Indeed, the lack of work has 
“a negative impact on the self-concept.”226  As noted in one study assessing 
the mental health needs of asylum seekers in the United Kingdom, “[s]alient 
ongoing stressors identified across several studies include delays in the 
processing of refugee applications, conflict with immigration officials,
being denied a work permit, unemployment, separation from family, and 
loneliness and boredom.”227  Inability to work has also been cited as a major 
memories of the traumatic event, concentration and memory problems, and a range of
physical symptoms.  Disempowerment of individuals and communities is the goal of torture.”  
Mary Fabri et al., Caring for Torture Survivors: The Marjorie Kovler Center, in THE NEW 
HUMANITARIANS: INSPIRATION, INNOVATIONS, AND BLUEPRINTS FOR VISIONARIES 157, 157
(Chris E. Stout ed., 2009). 
224. “Nostalgia, depression, anxiety, guilt, anger and frustration are so severe that
many refugees toy with the idea of going home even though they fear the consequences.” 
Barry N. Stein, The Experience of Being a Refugee: Insights from the Research Literature, 
in REFUGEE MENTAL HEALTH IN RESETTLEMENT COUNTRIES 5, 14 (Carolyn L. Williams &
Joseph Westermeyer eds., 1986) (citing CHARLES ZWINGMANN & MARIA PFISTER-
AMMENDE, UPROOTING AND AFTER 8–10, 188 (1973)).  The author also notes that, “they
will confront the loss of their culture–their identity, their habits.  Every action that used to be
habitual or routine will require careful examination and consideration.  Stein, supra at 14 
(citing L. Etinger, The Symptomatology of Mental Disease Among Refugees in Norway, 106 
J. OF MENTAL SCI. 947, 947–66 (1960); J. EX, ADJUSTMENT AFTER MIGRATION: A  
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT BY REFUGEES TO A NEW
ENVIRONMENT 98–100 (Dr. G. Beijer ed., 1966)).  “Refugees suddenly find themselves 
virtual islands in a strange and sometimes hostile sea.” Id. (citing R.M. Mutiso,
Counseling of Refugees in Africa, Paper presented at Pan African Conference on Refugees,
Arusha, Tanzania (1979)).  Strains will appear at home because the husband can’t provide,
the women must work and the children don’t respect the old ways. (Hans Hoff, Home and
Identity, in UPROOTING AND RESETTLEMENT 130–41 (1960); Elfan Rees, Common Psychological 
Factors in Refugee Problems Throughout the World, in UPROOTING AND RESETTLEMENT
31–43 (1960). Id. 
225. Angela Burnett & Michael Peel, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Britain, Health 
Needs of Asylum Seekers and Refugees, 322 BRIT. MED. J. 544, 545 (2001).  A study of
immigrants to Canada found that the longer they were unemployed, the more likely they
would suffer from “stress, negative self-concept, alienation from the society, and adaptation 
difficulties.”  Aycan & Berry, supra note 4, at 241. 
226. Id.
 227. COLLETT, supra note 13, at 83 (citing Derrick Silove et al., Policies of Deterrence
and the Mental Health of Asylum Seekers, 284 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 604, 606 (2000)). 
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factor in the breakdown of refugee families.228  They experience, “erosion 
of a sense of identity and independence, feelings of shame at having to 
beg and accept hand-outs for their survival, and the inability to integrate 
socially and economically into [the host] society.”229 
For women asylum seekers, the isolation and trauma are often even 
greater as a result of their inability to work.  Women asylum seekers live 
precarious lives while awaiting protection and are at risk of “physical
assault, sexual harassment, and rape.”230 They “are at special risk both 
during flight and in seeking asylum because of the dependency of children 
and the sick and disabled on them, and because of their vulnerability to
sexual exploitation.”231  Leaving vulnerable women without the ability to
work lawfully pushes them into even more precarious situations, as they 
must either work unlawfully and risk exploitation or live off the assistance 
of others.
In contrast, studies have shown that “[r]educing isolation and dependence, 
having suitable accommodation, and spending time more creatively
through education or work can often do much to relieve depression and 
anxiety.”232 
X. CONCLUSION 
“UNHCR is of the opinion that within the humanitarian spirit of the 
Refugee Convention lies a State’s obligation to ensure that asylum-seekers 
enjoy basic subsistence support to sustain them in dignity during this
waiting period.”233 
Not allowing asylum seekers to work is often couched in terms of
reducing pull factors and ensuring that economic refugees do not abuse 
the asylum system in order to gain work permits.  However, not allowing 
228. See ANNE MCNEVIN, SEEKING SAFETY, NOT CHARITY: A REPORT IN SUPPORT OF
WORK-RIGHTS FOR ASYLUM-SEEKERS LIVING IN THE COMMUNITY ON BRIDGING VISA E 28  
(2005).
 229. Id. 
230. Burnett & Peel, supra note 225, at 546. 
231. COLLETT, supra note 13, at 81 (citing Marjorie A. Muecke, New Paradigms for
Refugee Health Problems, 35 SOC. SCI. & MED. 515, 517–18 (1992)). 
232. Burnett & Peel, supra note 225, at 545.  “Positive changes can be seen as immigrants 
adjust, are reunited with families, and take up educational and employment opportunities.”
Id. (citing J. Shackman & J. Reynolds, Working with Refugees and Torture Survivors: Help
for the Helpers, in  MENTAL HEALTH MATTERS: A READER. London: Macmillan, Open
University (Heller T., Reynolds J., Gomm R., Pattison S., eds., 1996). 
233. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Representations to the Social
Security Advisory Committee on the “Social Security (Persons from Abroad) Miscellaneous
Amendment Regulations 1995”, (Nov. 10, 1995), available at http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3ae6b31daf.html [http://perma.cc/WZA7-WH3X].
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asylum seekers to work—like mandatory detention of asylum seekers— 
does not reach its intended goal and should be viewed as a punitive 
measure aimed at discouraging access to asylum in contravention of the 
Refugee Convention and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.234 
Consistent with these international directives, Congress should act to
rescind the ban on work authorization denials for asylum seekers. 
234. Various studies support this conclusion.  For example a study in Norway
concluded, “All in all, our findings suggest that the increased restrictions in respect of 
permission to work have not proved to be any discouragement to potential asylum-
seekers.” See Marko Valenta & Kristin Thorshaug, Asylum-Seekers’ Perspectives on
Work and Proof of Identity: The Norwegian Experience, 31 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 76, 87 
(2012).  Although work is a factor that can attract asylum seekers to a particular country, 
restrictions on the right to work will not serve as a deterrent if the employment market 
allows for opportunities in the informal labor market. Id.  Rational choice theory also
suggests that asylum seekers are concerned with safety, protection, and a better life for
their children. Id. at 89. Whether there is a lawful right to work during the asylum process will 
have little deterrent effect.  Numerous studies have confirmed that removing the right to work
and social rights has marginal impact on decreasing the number of asylum seekers. Id. 
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